What was the Mongol's advantage in battle that was so overwhelming?
Why couldn't they keep what they conquered?
Why did no later army emulate their success?
And why did the Mongols fall into historical obscurity?
Greetings!
Excellent questions, my friend!
What was the Mongol's advantage in battle that was so overwhelming?
This, I think, is a fascinating question that the popular answer through standard scholarship on the surface seems to reach for a quick an obvious answer--that the Mongols were always mounted, well-armed, and ultimately swift and more mobile than their many adversaries. However, I believe that the truth of the matter, and a more accurate understanding, actually embraces the simple explanation, but goes far beyond it. It is generally true--the Mongols were well-armed, and swift, and more mobile than their many adversaries--but not merely in their tactical formations and deployment physically, on the battlefield. They were swift and mobile in their philosophy and thinking. Genghis Khan is quoted as often saying, "There is no good in anything until it is finished." In some ways, I see this statement as reflective of a deeply pragmatic approach to life, similar to "The ends justify the means." That is not to say that the Mongols did not believe or embrace a moral code, because they did. Their morality was often very devout and ruthlessly strict--but it was different from the moral philosophies typically embraced by civilized, sedentary, agriculture-based cultures.
The Mongols embraced a ruthlessly pragmatic philosophy of warfare, that number one, placed a premium on preserving the lives of Mongol soldiers; secondly, Mongol philosophy as part of their hunting, nomadic culture, demanded that they seek and use every advantage in which to survive. Mongol military philosophy reflected this central value as well, and always encouraged Mongol commanders to always seek out the best terrain, the best circumstances and most advantageous environment or battlefield, in which to fight against their enemies. This included of course, natural terrain, as well as climate, and time of season and day--but also in other factors, psychological factors, that the Mongols could create, inspire, and exploit in their enemies. For example, the Mongols often went into battle against their enemies, and used swarming tactics, and seemingly dividing their forces up into several, swiftly moving units--which then converged on the enemy and made mass arrow barrages, but also charges with heavier cavalry armed with lances. These Mongolian forces would use their superior mobility to attack, and withdraw, and attack again--all of the separate Mongolian units would be involved in doing this during a given battle, thus frequently making their enemies believe that the Mongol hordes vastly outnumbered them, and there were always more Mongolian forces arriving to overwhelm their own forces. This kind of tactic demoralized many enemies. Knowing this, the Mongols would often partially encircle an enemy army, and purposely leave a single escape route. Many, many enemies, believing themselves to be outnumbered, outmaneuvered, and always suffering more casualties from the unending barrages of arrows, their own leadership often dead, or wavering--would then leap at the apparent escape route. The Mongols knew that their enemies would respond in such a manner, and already had mounted units waiting in reserve, to then pursue the fleeing and panicked enemy forces.
The fleeing enemy forces were then promptly slaughtered by the fresh Mongolian forces sweeping in to pursue them. These enemy forces were far easier to slaughter and defeat as they were running away--than standing and fighting the Mongols in fierce battle. In this critically important tactic, the Mongols also kept their own losses at a minimum, while at the same time, maximizing the slaughtered enemy. More dead enemy soldiers *today*--meant fewer enemy soldiers to face the Mongol forces tomorrow. The Mongols essentially placed the survival of their own soldiers, and the achievement of victory--as a higher and total morality or moral value--above whatever the enemy believed was moral. Whatever the enemy felt was "moral" was absolutely irrelevant to the Mongols. What was the ultimate "moral good" for the Mongols, in their world view, was were more Mongol soldiers alive and well, and was victory achieved? It is with these primary moral values that shaped their military tactics. Deceit, trickery, feints, all manner of tactical deceptions, psychological warfare, ruses--none of these things were considered improper, shameful, or unacceptable in warfare, and pursuing victory.
The Mongols used barrels loaded with diseased rats to fire from their catapults in sieges against enemy cities--again, with the express purpose of causing more of the enemy to die, and thus reduce the strength of the enemy to resist and cause more Mongolian casualties. In a similar manner, as in the Mongol conquest of the Khwarazm Empire, the Mongols routinely marched tens of thousands of captured enemy Muslim civilians into the front ranks of their assault forces--with three goals in mind; psychologically stressing the defending Muslims, with them knowing that attempting to defend themselves, they were in so doing, slaughtering their own people out in front of their battlements; next, by employing such "Human Shields"--the Mongols were causing the enemy defenders to use their energy and their war supplies, arrows, and so on--against throngs of their own people, instead of using them against attacking Mongol warriors; the third purpose, as an extension, was that there were fewer Mongolian casualties. The Muslims, Christians, and Confucian/Taoist Chinese all believed such tactics were entirely evil, and unthinkable. The Mongols thought such was entirely fine and good tactics--at the end of the day, who was alive, and who was dead? Who were the masters, and who were on their knees?
Thus, I would say that it was a combination of:
(1): Tactical mobility and swiftness;
(2): Greater Tactical Consciousness of All Available Advantages in Warfare; Environmental, Climate, Physical Terrain, Supplies, and Psychology; A more keen appreciation philosophically of being always conscious of using whatever physical, environmental, climate and terrain to their advantage, prior to engaging in battle, to maximize their chances for victory against their enemies;
(3): Warrior Culture of Ruthless Discipline; the Mongols also had created a warrior culture that demanded a very high standard of individual discipline, toughness and rugged tenacity, a fierce esprit de corps among the warriors, and a sense of absolute ruthless discipline of obedience and loyalty to their commanding officers; The special organizational reforms created by Genghis Khan ignored blood, lineage, nobility, status--all of the values that choked operational flexibility and unity in the Chinese Empire, the Khwarazm Empire, the Caliphate, the Seljuk Turks, the Russian Princedoms, the Christian Kingdoms of Europe, and others. Merit, loyalty, efficiency, and skill were the primary values. Genghis Khan enforced these values on every Mongol, whether he was a Khan, an officer, or a common soldier. That kind of unit discipline and morale, and organizational unity and loyalty, truly were revolutionary for the day. No one else had anything like it, particularly on the mass scale that the Mongols achieved. Certainly, small units embraced such in non-Mongol nations, but not to the scale achieved by the Mongols, for the Mongols created and enforced this organization *systematically* on everyone, regardless of birth, status or where they were from. This was also demanded of foreign soldiers joining the Mongols and fighting under Mongol banners.
(4): Ruthless Moral Pragmatism; A deeper philosophy of ruthless pragmatism that placed the preservation of Mongol soldier's lives and the achievement of victory as being the highest priority, above any other concerns.
These four elements were vigorously embraced by every Mongol soldier and officer, each and every one, without exception. By Mongol law, a single Mongol soldier that retreated, would cause the other nine members as well as the coward, to be executed. Hence, Mongols very seldom retreated, without being ordered officially to do so. I imagine there may have been an instance or two where ordinary Mongol soldiers panicked and retreated, without orders, thus contributing to a defeat or rout, but such instances were extremely rare, and virtually unheard of. That kind of steel-like discipline and trust, that total confidence of unit morale, command and control, of everyone in the unit, the whole horde, being united together, and committed to victory or fighting to the death together, we can see is consistently true of Mongol armies fighting everywhere, from Central Asia and China, to Persia, Turkey, Russia, Europe, and the Balkans, whether in the field of open battle, or in sieges of great cities and fortresses.
Why couldn't they keep what they conquered?
Well, this is a good question that I too, have long wondered about. Some history books can be somewhat vague about this. Nonetheless, the answer seems to be best accounted for several elements. Remember also, the Mongolian Empire did not just persist while Genghis Khan was alive, and building his empire for 30 or 40 years; the Mongolian Empire endured, reaching an enormous zenith and flourishing until 1368. The Mongolian Empire had gradually been broken up into parts by the sons and descendants of Genghis Khan that were ruling several successor empires. The Golden Horde Khanate (Europe and Russia), the IlKhanate (Turkey, Syria and Persia), the Chagatai Khanate (Khwarazm Empire, Central Asia), and the Yuan Empire (Mongolia, Tibet, Korea, and China). The four successor empires of the Mongolian Empire were periodically loosely allied, but often embroiled in bitter civil wars against each other. The Mongols could not seem to hold onto what they had conquered, for the reasons of political ambition and civil war, family rivalries (some deep-seated emotional family dynamics which critically contributed to the rivalries and personal animosities that encouraged the civil wars between each other); holding onto a barbarian, tribal mentality (The Mongolian leadership for example viewed their ambitions primarily in light of their own personal glory, and the authority and glory of their own family, as opposed to really embracing a larger, national or cultural identity that was separate from themselves, and ultimately more important than themselves); Finally, the Mongol princes that inherited Ghengis Khan's glorious empire simply did not possess the absolute genius abilities of Ghengis Khan.
I would also say it is not entirely about his military genius, his strategic genius, his masterful skills in diplomacy, but also simply his great vision. (Ghengis Khan had a personal, cultural, social, and even spiritual vision for how to shape and build a new Mongolia, but also how to impose this new empire on the world, and change the world around it as well.) Ghengis Khan was a powerful, visionary thinker, and held visions of society, government, culture, and religions, that were very advanced and novel for anyone at the time, and the various descendants of his didn't really embrace these visions--they just couldn't really grasp and comprehend what Ghengis Khan was trying to forge with the Mongolian Empire.
Why did no later army emulate their success?
I would certainly say that the Mongols have had an immense influence on a huge variety of different cultures, impacting general culture, society, economies, and religious thought in many ways through the ages, but especially so in military tactics and organization. However, the military specifics of changing the structure of how a military force is organized, what equipment and weaponry it is equipped with, and what tactics it seeks to employ are useful, and powerful, but insufficient by themselves. Later armies did not possess the barbarian, nomadic mindset, lifestyle, and worldview, which deeply inculcated many of the principles that went into *how* the Mongols used their organization, equipment, and tactics to achieve such momentous and absolute victories. In addition, various future armies were not commanded and led by someone with the absolute genius of Ghengis Khan, or of the great General Subatai, or even Helagu.
And why did the Mongols fall into historical obscurity?
In my view, the Mongols, as a barbarian, nomadic culture, simply were not ready, as a culture, to embrace nationalism and a unified civilization. Even in the West, whether looking at Greece, Rome, Persia, the Britons, the Germanic tribes, and eastwards to India and China, embracing nationalism and a unified civilization generally takes several hundred years, sometimes more. The Mongols could not make such a transition in merely 150 years. They needed more time to do that, and with the frequent civil wars, the rebellions of conquered peoples, and the absence of an interior philosophical culture which could educate, train, and create more cultural elites to lead and train the nation, they could not soon reach such a place of national unity and identity. They naturally fell back into their old barbarian, tribal ways, with their endless feuding amongst families and clans over animals, local land, and interpersonal and family rivalries. Add up several generations of such tribalism, and they lost the status, wealth, and machinery of empire that were gained, and briefly held, by several earlier generations. Thus, in a relatively short span of time, the Mongols fell into historical obscurity--which is where they had always been historically before the arrival of Ghengis Khan.
Semper Fidelis,
SHARK